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COMMENTS
The Amended Attorney-Client Privilege in Oklahoma: A
Misstep in the Right Direction
I. Introduction
Pretrial discovery—especially electronic discovery—can cost millions of
dollars.1 One of the more costly aspects of electronic discovery is conducting
privilege review prior to disclosing to an adversary documents requested
during discovery.2 Due to the increasing variety of methods for storing
potentially discoverable documents, and to the increasing number of
discoverable documents (intraoffice email, for example), the hours attorneys
must dedicate to privilege review can number in the hundreds, or even
thousands.3 One way practitioners in federal courts can mitigate rising costs
from privilege review is to make use of fairly recent additions to the Federal
Rules.4 Federal courts may limit the scope of discovery of electronically
stored information (ESI)5 or enter orders ruling that certain disclosures of
confidential information to other parties do not waive attorney-client privilege
or work product protection.6 The Federal Rules of Evidence further mitigate
privilege review costs and the damage of disclosure by limiting subject matter
waiver and offering some protection for inadvertent disclosures.7
Until November 1, 2009, practitioners in Oklahoma’s state courts had only
some of these options readily available to them. Disclosures of attorney-client
privileged material were governed by a variation on traditional waiver
doctrine.8 Under traditional waiver doctrine, voluntary disclosures result in
waiver of any privilege to keep the disclosed information confidential.9 Such

1. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446 (2004).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, U.S. COURTS, http://www.
uscourts.gov/uscourts/rulesandpolicies/rules/EDiscovery_w_Notes.pdf (last visited Feb. 21,
2011); FED. R. EVID. 502.
5. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B), (C).
6. See FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
7. See id. 502(a),(b). But see Robert D. Owen & Melissa H. Cozart, FRE 502: One Year
Later, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 13, 2009, at S4 (questioning the effectiveness of Federal Rule of Evidence
502 at mitigating costs since its adoption).
8. See 3 LEO H. WHINERY, OKLAHOMA EVIDENCE—COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 36.01 (2d ed. 2000).
9. See id. § 35.10.
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voluntary disclosures are also likely to result in waiver of privilege over
information related to the same subject matter.10
Some of the tools for protecting privilege that are available to litigants in
federal courts have now been made available to litigants in Oklahoma state
courts, altering Oklahoma’s waiver approach somewhat.11 House Bill 1597
was signed into law on May 22, 2009, and became effective on November 1,
2009.12 In an attempt to mitigate the high costs of discovery, and specifically
of privilege review, the new law amends the statute governing attorney-client
privilege in Oklahoma.13
This new law borrows inspiration and some language from Federal Rule of
Evidence 502, and from the proposed—but ultimately rejected—provision on
selective waiver.14 The new law limits subject matter waiver in Oklahoma, but
only in cases of selective waiver.15 Subject matter waiver occurs when a party
discloses a significant piece of privileged information and thereby waives
privilege with respect to the entirety of that information.16 The recently
enacted limitation on subject matter waiver provides that such waiver does not
occur unless it would be unfair to maintain the privileged nature of related but
undisclosed information.17
The new law also protects the privileged nature of information inadvertently
disclosed, similarly to the Federal Rules of Evidence.18 Inadvertent disclosure
occurs when a party discloses privileged information to its adversary that the
party would not have disclosed if it had more closely reviewed the information
prior to disclosure.19 The new law protects privilege over inadvertently

10. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2511 (Supp. 2002).
11. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2502(E), (F) (Supp. 2009).
12. See Act of May 22, 2009, ch. 251, § 2, 2009 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 1470, 1470-71
(West) (codified as amended at 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2502 (Supp. 2009)).
13. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2502.
14. Compare id. § 2502(E), (F), with FED. R. EVID. 502(a), (b), and Proposed Federal Rule
of Evidence 502(c) [hereinafter Proposed FED. R. EVID. 502], available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/EV05-2006.pdf. Selective waiver allows a party
to voluntarily disclose privileged information to the government without waiving the privilege
with respect to its civil adversaries. See, e.g., Liesa L. Richter, Corporate Salvation or
Damnation? Proposed New Federal Legislation on Selective Waiver, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 129,
132 (2007).
15. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2502(F).
16. See, e.g., id. § 2511.
17. See id. § 2502(F).
18. Id. § 2502(E).
19. See Kenneth S. Broun & Daniel J. Capra, Getting Control of Waiver of Privilege in the
Federal Courts: A Proposal For Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 58 S.C. L. REV. 211, 219-20
(2006).
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disclosed information so long as reasonable steps were taken to prevent and
rectify the particular error(s) made in disclosing.20
The new law, although intended to mitigate preproduction privilege review
costs, is not well-drafted and does not seem to have been fully considered.
The amendments are probably a response to ballooning discovery and
litigation costs associated with privilege review, as is the case with the Federal
Rule that inspired them.21 If so, the changes to Oklahoma privilege law reveal
an intent to lower the costs of privilege review.
Unfortunately the Oklahoma provisions were cherry-picked from adopted
and proposed Federal Rules, and the end result is strikingly dissimilar to the
Federal Rules.22 The provisions chosen and the manner in which they were
drafted into Oklahoma law likely will not do much to effectuate the intent of
the amendment. The provisions of the Federal Rules that were omitted from
the Oklahoma statute would be more effective in this endeavor.
The new law should have included a provision similar to Federal Rule of
Evidence 502(d) that would enable courts to issue orders protecting attorneyclient privilege for information voluntarily disclosed under “claw-back” and
“quick peek” agreements.23 It should also have uncoupled the limitation on
subject matter waiver from selective waiver. Because of its failure to do so the
amended statute seems unlikely to succeed at widely mitigating inflated
litigation costs.
This comment will analyze the amendments to attorney-client privilege law
in Oklahoma through the lens of the Federal Rules, enacted and rejected. Part
II of this comment will discuss the history and background behind Federal
Rule of Evidence 502 and explain why traditional waiver doctrine and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure left a perceived need for the rule and its
operation. It will summarize the operation of select provisions of Federal Rule
of Evidence 502, focusing on the limitation of subject matter waiver,
protection of inadvertent disclosures, and allowance of court orders to protect
the privileged status of disclosures.
Part III will summarize the relevant discovery provisions and law of
attorney-client privilege in Oklahoma prior to the enactment of the amended
statute. This summary will focus on the issues of subject matter waiver,
inadvertent disclosure, and controlling court orders protecting privilege.
Additionally, Part III will posit that Oklahoma’s variation on traditional waiver
doctrine and the similarity of Oklahoma’s Discovery Code to the Federal
20. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2502(E).
21. See FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note.
22. Compare 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2502(E), (F), with FED. R. EVID. 502 and Proposed FED.
R. EVID. 502, supra note 14.
23. See FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note.
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Rules of Civil Procedure create the same expensive discovery costs at the state
level that gave rise to Federal Rule of Evidence 502 at the federal level.
Part IV will examine the pertinent text of the amended statute compared to
the pertinent text of Federal Rule of Evidence 502 and Proposed Federal Rule
of Evidence 502(c). Part V will then argue that the amended statute is
beneficial, but ultimately will not be as effective at reducing discovery costs
as other provisions might have been. This argument provides a likely
construction of the amendments and identifies some issues of clarity present
in the amended statute. This part will then analyze problems arising from
these issues, and make recommendations for changes to the amended statute
and for further legislation to introduce provisions that would more effectively
mitigate discovery costs. Part VI will summarize and conclude.
II. Background at the Federal Level to the Adoption of Federal Rule of
Evidence 502
A. Traditional Waiver Doctrine
In general, all relevant evidence is admissible in federal court.24 There are,
however, some exceptions to this rule.25 Among these exceptions is material
that is protected by a legally recognized privilege.26 A privilege exists to keep
certain information confidential in service of a statutorily recognized public
policy “for the purpose of protecting certain relationships and encouraging the
open and free flow of communication between persons in such relationships.”27
Foremost among the traditionally recognized privileges at the federal and
state levels is the attorney-client privilege.28 The privilege is held by the
client, protects the client, and may be invoked by the client or the client’s
representative.29 Because the client holds the power to invoke the privilege,
it follows that the client has the ability to waive the privilege.30
Under traditional waiver doctrine, if the client discloses privileged
information to any nonprivileged third party, the client waives the privilege as

24. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 402.
25. See id.
26. See, e.g., id. 402 advisory committee’s note (listing privileges among the types of
relevant evidence excluded “in response to the demands of particular policies”).
27. 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 273 (2004).
28. See id. § 325; 3 WHINERY, supra note 8, § 36.01.
29. See, e.g., 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2502 (Supp. 2009); 3 WHINERY, supra note 8, § 35.02
(noting an alternative, but less influential, justification for privileges is “protect[ing] the
essential privacy of significant human relationships independent of whether they have any effect
on the conduct of persons within that relationship”).
30. 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 334.
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to that information.31 Furthermore, this waiver extends to other information
relating to the same subject matter.32 One federal court has colorfully noted
that, under traditional waiver doctrine, “if a client wishes to preserve the
privilege, it must treat the confidentiality of attorney-client communications
like jewels—if not crown jewels.”33 As a result, the attorney-client privilege
must be zealously guarded, lest confidential communications and their subject
matter be admissible as evidence. This can be problematic in light of modern
liberal discovery requirements.
B. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Liberal Discovery
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for liberal discovery and require
disclosure of a rather large variety and amount of information, including ESI.34
Parties are not required to disclose information covered by the attorney-client
privilege or the work product doctrine.35 The discovery process in most cases
commences after the parties have had a discovery conference.36
At that conference, the parties may agree to limit the scope of discovery and
to utilize “quick peeks” and “claw-backs.”37 Quick peeks are agreements in
which one party discloses material requested by the other for examination
without conducting privilege review and without waiving the privilege to keep
that material confidential; the receiving party then determines the subject
matter of the information and requests discovery of the documents it actually
wants; and the disclosing party reviews only those documents for privilege.38
Claw-backs are agreements between parties that ensure that privilege is not
waived for materials inadvertently disclosed and returned pursuant to the
agreement, which often tracks Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B).39
After the discovery conference, a court issues a scheduling order at a pretrial
conference to govern discovery, and that order may memorialize party
agreements.40
Another option for preventing overly-costly electronic discovery exists in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 26 allows parties to identify those
31. See id. § 336; 3 WHINERY, supra note 8, § 35.11; see also 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2511.
32. See 3 WHINERY, supra note 8, § 35.11; see also 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2511.
33. In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
34. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
35. See id. 26(b)(1), (3)(A). The work product doctrine is similar to attorney-client
privilege, but differs in that it is a privilege held by the attorney to protect information prepared
in expectation of litigation. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509-11 (1947).
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1).
37. See id. 26(f) advisory committee’s note (discussing the 2006 amendment).
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id. 16, 16(b)(3)(B)(iv).
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materials “not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”41 This
exception provides no absolute protection from discovery costs because a court
may still order discovery of those materials for “good cause.”42
Despite these attempts at cost saving in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, absent legislation, the rules cannot alter the substantive law of
attorney-client privilege.43 Nor can courts be expected to reach consistent
rulings on whether attorney-client privilege is waived without some clear
guidance from the law of evidence, especially when non-parties to the subject
litigation are concerned.
C. Federal Courts Diverged on Whether the Attorney-Client Privilege Was
Waived in Cases of Disclosure
Great tension exists between traditional waiver doctrine on the one hand,
with its requirements for zealous defense of a client’s confidential information,
and the liberalized discovery encouraged by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure on the other. It was unfortunate for the federal system prior to the
effective date of Federal Rule of Evidence 502 that there was no clear answer,
and thus no uniform approach among the circuits, to the question of whether
certain disclosures resulted in waiver of attorney-client privilege.44
In the case of inadvertent disclosure, many federal courts held that the
privilege was waived.45 Some other federal courts found that the attorneyclient privilege still existed after inadvertent disclosure, although these
jurisdictions were the minority.46 Still other federal courts applied a fairness
test similar to the one now embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b).47
This hodge-podge approach to inadvertent waiver created disparate results.
Even in the courts where inadvertent disclosure automatically resulted in
waiver, it did not always result in subject matter waiver.48 A disparity in
approaches to subject matter waiver—finding it or not finding it—also existed
at the federal level.49

41. Id. 26(b)(2)(B), (C).
42. See id.
43. See Broun & Capra, supra note 19, at 215, 217. Note that Federal Rule of Evidence
502 was enacted by Congress, rather than by the Court pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, and
is therefore the legislative action required. See id. at 242-43.
44. See id. at 217.
45. See id. at 221.
46. See id. at 220.
47. See id. at 222-24.
48. See id. at 224-29.
49. See id. at 224.
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Claw-backs and quick peeks, although they were suggested by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,50 were not the panacea to costly discovery that they
were intended to be. These tools represented a mitigation effort from the civil
procedure side of litigation that, absent some evidentiary corollary, had no
teeth. Prior to Federal Rule of Evidence 502, it was likely, or at least
imminently possible, that a court would follow traditional waiver doctrine to
find that privilege was waived; or at least waived with respect to nonparties to
the agreements.51 In some cases, however, courts also found the opposite: that
because of the existence of the agreements, the privilege was not waived.52
Ultimately, prior to the enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 502, the only
safe suggestion for parties that wished to preserve privilege was to conduct
intensive privilege review. Privilege review is costly because parties spend
many hours locating and compiling information to respond to discovery
requests, and then many more hours reviewing that information for privilege
in order to prevent the damage done by disclosure.53
D. Discovery Costs Balloon With Privilege Review for Electronic Discovery
The issue that really put a spark to this powder keg was electronic
discovery.54 With the widespread adoption and utilization of computers,
“[c]omputerized data have become commonplace in litigation.”55 Privilege
review was already complex and costly prior to the widespread use of
electronic data storage.56 The most useful check on production costs
then—“the time and resources available to the requesting parties to review and
photocopy the documents”—has now been shifted as a burden to the
responding party.57 Now confidential information is often stored on the same
discrete hard drive as information over which no privilege will be claimed,
even if the information is kept in different “files.”
Because the responding party must locate the requested ESI and screen it
for privilege, and because backup data may now be measured in terabytes,
which equate to “500 billion typewritten pages of plain text,” it is easy to see

50. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note (discussing the 2006 amendment).
51. Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 MICH. L. REV.
1605, 1612 (1986).
52. See, e.g., Hopson v. Mayor of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 234-35 (D. Md. 2005) (collecting
cases that have found an agreement to protect disclosures from waiver); Marcus, supra note 51,
at 1611-13 (same).
53. See Broun & Capra, supra note 19, at 213-14.
54. See id.
55. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446 (2004).
56. See id.
57. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011

286

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:279

how discovery costs may quite easily get out of hand.58 Furthermore, largescale use of ESI is no longer only affordable for the largest corporations; the
cost of terabyte data storage—$74.99 for a one terabyte external hard disk
drive, as of June 2010—continues to decline.59 If one considers how long it
would take to read anywhere near this much text and then applies even the
cheapest attorney’s hourly rate, it becomes apparent that discovery can quickly
become more costly than any other facet of litigation, easily reaching millions
of dollars. The issue is only compounded when the focus of electronic
discovery moves beyond this first layer data to the metadata.60
A recent survey of attorneys provides anecdotal evidence to support the
proposition that discovery costs are prohibitive.61 The survey considered
responses from 1,382 attorneys engaged in litigation in federal and state courts
in spring of 2008.62 The results reveal that there is widespread perception of
ballooning discovery costs, with “[t]he vast majority (75 percent) of . . .
respondents confirm[ing] the fact that electronic discovery has resulted in a
disproportionate increase in the expense of discovery and thus an increase in
total litigation expense.”63 When faced with this increase in expense litigants
may be discouraged from pursuing meritorious claims.
E. The Provisions of Federal Rule of Evidence 502 and Its Projected Result
Federal Rule of Evidence 502 was drafted amid these concerns in an effort
to allow some escape from the rock of waiver and the hard place of privilege
review.64 The Federal Rule establishes exceptions to common law waiver
rules, rather than statutorily mandating when waiver occurs.65 Among the

58. Id.
59. Iomega eGo Desktop 1TB USB 2.0 Midnight Blue External Hard Drive 34837,
NEWEGG.COM, http://www.newegg.com/Product/Product.aspx?Item=N82E16822186219 (last
visited Sept. 13, 2010).
60. See generally Elliot Paul Anderson, What Lies Beneath: Native Format Production and
Discovery of Metadata in Federal Court, 78 OKLA. B.J. 999 (2007). Metadata is “‘information
about information,’” including when and by whom ESI was created, changed, accessed, or
deleted. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446 (2004).
61. See AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, TASKFORCE ON DISCOVERY & THE INST. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT 1-2 (2009)
[hereinafter ACTL-IAALS FINAL REPORT], available at http://www.actl.com (follow “All
Publications” hyperlink under “Publications”; then follow “ACTL-IAALS OFFICIAL FINAL
REPORT” hyperlink).
62. Id. at 2.
63. Id. at 16.
64. See generally Broun & Capra, supra note 19, at 217 (recognizing practitioner’s difficult
choices in balancing cost and the protection of privileges).
65. See id. at 257-58.
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provisions of the Federal Rule are a limitation on subject matter waiver,66 a
standardized approach to inadvertent disclosure,67 and a provision allowing for
controlling court orders to protect privilege of disclosed information.68
The Federal Rule limits the occurrence of subject matter waiver of
information disclosed in federal proceedings or to federal offices or agencies,
unless the waiver is intentional and “ought in fairness to be considered
together” with the undisclosed information.69 The rule’s test for determining
when subject matter waiver should occur is modeled after Federal Rule of
Evidence 106, and is designed to prevent strategic disclosure.70 That is,
subject matter waiver should only be found in those cases where an intentional
disclosure of some, but not all, privileged information was made because the
partial disclosure distorts the truth or misdirects discovery. The result is a
presumption against subject matter waiver.71
Federal Rule 502 also standardizes the approach federal courts take to
address inadvertent disclosures made in a federal proceeding or to a federal
office or agency by requiring a test of the reasonableness of steps taken to
prevent and to rectify inadvertent disclosures of privileged information.72 The
rule is intended to take the middle ground between treating all inadvertent
disclosures as waivers or no inadvertent disclosures as waivers.73
Federal Rule 502 allows a federal court to order that a disclosure does not
operate as a waiver, and holds that order binding even on other parties in state
and federal courts.74 Only a court order issued pursuant to this rule can bind
non-parties in state and federal courts to any non-waiver agreements—such as
claw-backs and quick peeks—made between parties.75
In addition to these notable provisions, Federal Rule 502 protects privilege
in federal proceedings of disclosures made in prior state court proceedings that
constituted waiver in state court, but would not have constituted waiver had
the disclosures been made in federal court.76 It also protects a disclosure that
might have been a waiver in federal court but was not under the law of the
66. See FED. R. EVID. 502(a).
67. See id. 502(b).
68. See id. 502(d).
69. Id. 502(a). Here “fairness” will usually not require subject matter waiver.
70. See id. 502(a) advisory committee’s note.
71. See id.
72. See id. 502(b).
73. See id. 502(b) advisory committee’s note.
74. See id. 502(d). Any federalism concerns are beyond the scope of this comment, but an
argument for the constitutionality of this approach may be found in Broun & Capra, supra note
19, at 240-45.
75. See FED. R. EVID. 502(e).
76. See id. 502(c).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011

288

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:279

state where the disclosure occurred.77 The rule requires state courts to
recognize as privileged any information that was disclosed under the
protection of the rule, even if such disclosures are not privileged under state
law; and applies to state court causes of action that are heard in federal
courts.78 The rule does not alter state privilege law in state court cases that
have no connection to federal proceedings.79
The Federal Rule’s limit on subject matter waiver should mitigate discovery
costs by discouraging disputes over privilege claims made to protect against
subject matter waiver.80 Furthermore, disclosures made in federal proceedings
will not result in subject matter waiver in subsequent state proceedings.81
Inadvertent disclosures will not result in absolute waiver of privilege, but nor
will they enjoy absolute immunity from waiver.82 This middle-ground
approach prevents parties from taking a careless approach to privilege review
(by still requiring reasonable steps to have been taken to prevent the
disclosure; i.e., some privilege review), while not punishing them for failing
to spend every last dime the client has on that privilege review and fighting
requests for disclosure.83 Because the Federal Rule applies only when federal
proceedings are involved, however, the lowered discovery costs intended from
Federal Rule of Evidence 502 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)
will not be found in state court, absent similar protections at the state level.
This is problematic, as “[t]he costs of discovery can be equally high for state
and federal causes of action . . . .”84
III. Oklahoma’s Attorney-Client Privilege Law Was a Barrier to Mitigating
Discovery Costs
States have recognized that the skyrocketing costs of discovery are not
unique to the federal court system.85 This is especially true when a state
follows traditional waiver doctrine and has discovery provisions similar to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because federal decisions on the Federal
77. See id.
78. See id. 502(f) advisory committee’s note.
79. See id. 502 advisory committee’s note.
80. See Marcus, supra note 51, at 1606.
81. See FED. R. EVID. 502(a) advisory committee’s note.
82. See id. 502(b).
83. See Broun & Capra, supra note 19, at 220-22.
84. FED. R. EVID. 502(f) advisory committee’s note.
85. See Case Law and Rules: State Rules of Civil Procedure, FIOS, INC., http://www.
fiosinc.com/case-law-rules/e-discovery-state-rules-civil-procedure.aspx (last visited Feb. 12,
2010) (summarizing by state the status of attempts to enact provisions governing electronic
discovery, and hyperlinking to extra-site support).
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Rules are likely to influence state decisions on their own rules.86 Some states
are struggling to combat rising privilege review costs in their own courts,
either by adopting approaches similar to those in Federal Rule of Evidence
50287 or by adopting their own approach to deal with increased discovery
costs.88
Prior to the passage of House Bill 1597, Oklahoma had made no substantial
changes to its discovery code or to attorney-client privilege law that could
effectively combat these rising discovery costs. A disclosure made pursuant
to a discovery request would likely result in waiver of privilege as to that
disclosure and its related subject matter. Because the amendment does not
rescind existing statutes but is instead appended to them, an examination of
Oklahoma attorney-client privilege law prior to the amendment’s passage is
necessary.
A. The State of the Law Prior to November 01, 2009
The Oklahoma Evidence Code controls the law of evidence in both criminal
and civil proceedings.89 By its own mandate, “[the Oklahoma Evidence Code]
shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay and promotion of growth and development of
the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined.”90 This is substantially the same language as
Federal Rule of Evidence 102, and carries the same meaning.91 The committee
chose to draft a code similar to the Federal Rules of Evidence, “largely to
assure uniformity between the Federal Rules and any Oklahoma code that
might be adopted subsequently.”92

86. See Ed Abel & Lynn B. Mares, Discovery Rule 26—A Practitioner’s Guide to State and
Federal Rules, 79 OKLA. B.J. 509, 511 (2008).
87. See, e.g., Harp v. King, 835 A.2d 953, 965-70 (Conn. 2003) (considering the various
approaches to inadvertent disclosure and adopting a moderate approach and a five-factor test
similar to the test now embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence 502).
88. See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.3(d) (allowing privilege to be asserted and protected after
disclosure).
89. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2103(A) (Supp. 2002).
90. Id. § 2102 (2001).
91. See Leo H. Whinery, The Oklahoma Evidence Code: The Background, and Overview
and the General Provisions of Article I, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 259, 263-64 (1979) (“As with its
companion Federal Rule 102, it establishes flexibility as the underlying principle within which
the Code is to be applied and interpreted.”) (citation omitted).
92. SUBCOMM. ON EVID. OF THE CODE P.—CIVIL COMM. OF THE OKLA. B. ASS’N, Proposed
Oklahoma Code of Evidence, 47 OKLA. B.J. 2605, 2606 (1976) [hereinafter SUBCOMM. ON
EVID.] (Subcommittee Chairman Ed Abel’s introduction to the proposed rules).
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Oklahoma’s laws governing privilege—sections 2501 through 2513 of Title
12 of the Oklahoma Statutes—are based on those rules that comprise “Article
V of the Uniform Rules of Evidence.”93 These rules were not incorporated
into the Federal Rules of Evidence due to federalism concerns in the area of
the substantive law of privilege.94 Because Oklahoma’s privilege rules are
substantially based on what would have been the Federal Rules, however, it
is fair to say that the same policy that underlies the Federal Rules underlies the
Oklahoma rules on privilege. That is, the rules adopted by Oklahoma were
drafted substantially by the authors of the Federal Rules to be included among
those rules, but were not included due to federalism concerns rather than any
policy discrepancy.
Attorney-client privilege in Oklahoma was governed by the superseded
version of title 12, section 2502, of the Oklahoma Statutes (and remains
governed by the same section as amended).95 In addition to portions of section
2502, waiver of privilege is also governed by sections 2511 and 2512 of the
same title. Section 2511 governs voluntary disclosure,96 and section 2512
governs disclosures that are erroneously compelled or made with no
opportunity to claim a privilege.97
1. The Oklahoma Discovery Code
The Oklahoma Discovery Code98 is substantially similar to the discovery
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and tracks those rules in
several important respects.99 It requires the same liberal disclosure of
information in discovery by allowing “discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action.”100 Parties claiming privilege must support that claim with a
description of “the nature of the . . . things not produced or disclosed in a
93. Id. at 2625. These rules were variations on those proposed for, but not incorporated
into, the Federal Rules. See id.
94. See Kenneth N. McKinney, Commentary, Privileges, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 307, 309 n.14
(1979) (“[O]ne of the major arguments against enactment of the Supreme Court’s proposed
rules . . . was the constitutional inability of the Congress to delegate to the Supreme Court rulemaking authority as to substantive issues.”).
95. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2502 (1978) (current version at 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2502 (Supp.
2009)).
96. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2511 (Supp. 2002).
97. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2512 (2001).
98. 12 OKLA. STAT. §§ 3224-3237 (2001 & Supp. 2010).
99. Compare id., with FED. R. CIV. P. 1, 26-37. See also Abel & Mares, supra note 86, at
511; Judge Stephen P. Friot, Discovery of Electronic Documents and Other Digital Data, 74
OKLA. B.J. 1463, 1463 (2003).
100. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3226(B)(1)(a) (Supp. 2010).
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manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will
enable other parties to assess the . . . ” claim.101 The court may require a party
objecting to discovery on grounds of privilege to file a privilege log.102 A
privilege log includes the author, recipient, origination date, length, nature or
purpose, and basis for objection for each document over which privilege is
claimed.103
Parties may also move for a protective order upon a showing of both good
cause and a good faith attempt to confer with the other parties, and the court
“may enter any order which justice requires to protect a party from annoyance,
harassment, embarrassment, oppression or undue delay, burden or expense.”104
Although information that is actually privileged is not discoverable, because
of the wide discoverability of most information,105 and the similarity between
the Oklahoma Discovery Code and the discovery provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,106 it follows that the Oklahoma Discovery Code
favors liberal disclosure.
2. Subject Matter Waiver in Oklahoma
Voluntary disclosure of information otherwise covered by the attorneyclient privilege operates as a waiver of that privilege.107 Waiver “gives effect
to the central idea of the privilege that when the holder of the privilege
discloses the privileged matter the privilege is destroyed.”108 In other words,
once the cat has been let out of the bag it cannot be returned. This rule is
governed by a party’s intent to disclose information, not his or her intent to
waive a privilege.109 As a result, the cases do not seem to treat voluntary
101. Id. § 3226(B)(5)(a).
102. See id. § 3237(A)(2); see also Scott v. Peterson, 2005 OK 84, ¶ 24, 126 P.3d 1232,
1238-39 (holding that a privilege log is not required by title 12, section 3226, but that the
“[c]ourt may determine that a privilege log is necessary and order the party objecting to
discovery to file the log”).
103. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3237(A)(2) (Supp. 2010).
104. Id. § 3226(C)(1).
105. See id. § 3226(B)(1).
106. See Abel & Mares, supra note 86, at 511; Friot, supra note 99, at 1463.
107. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2511 (Supp. 2002).
108. SUBCOMM. ON EVID ., supra note 92, at 2633 (Evidence Subcommittee’s Note to
proposed rule 510).
109. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2502(A)(5), (E), (F) (Supp. 2002), amended by 12 O KLA. STAT. §
2502(E), (F) (Supp. 2009); see 3 WHINERY, supra note 8, § 36.08; see also Chandler v. Denton,
1987 OK 38, ¶ 21, 741 P.2d 855, 865-66 (“The fact that a client communicates with his attorney
within the hearing range of third persons and makes no attempt to prevent the communication
from being overheard is indicative that the conversation was not intended to be confidential.”);
Jayne v. Bateman, 1942 OK 298, ¶ 23, 129 P.2d 188, 191 (noting that “particular circumstances
[may] . . . preserve the confidential character of the communication”); Ratzlaff v. State, 1926
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disclosures that are intended to be confidential as disclosures which do not
waive the privilege so much as they seem to shield them in a legal fiction of
not having been disclosures at all; however, either interpretation is feasible.
The lack of clarifying case law leaves this an open question, so the rest of this
section will presume that both treatments are possible under Oklahoma law.
In any event, the result of either treatment is the same: the privilege is not
waived. This is the exception, rather than the rule. Voluntary (as in,
“intentional”) disclosure of information carries with it other perils than mere
waiver of the information disclosed.
Subject matter waiver—or some variation thereof—is recognized in
Oklahoma privilege law. Waiver of privileged subject matter occurs when the
voluntary disclosure is of “any significant part of the privileged matter.”110
This appears to be based on a policy of fairness.111 For courts pursuing this
policy, “[t]he difficulty arises in determining the point at which it is unfair for
the holder to insist that the privilege be honored.”112 Whinery describes the
section 2511 fairness test to determine when “a significant part” has been
disclosed as one of flexibility, in contrast to Wigmore, who would find
disclosure if any part were disclosed.113 Oklahoma case law has adopted the
former approach, but has not articulated particular factors that courts might
consider; rather, the test seems to be some variation of totality-of-thecircumstances, dependent on the facts of the case and the policy supporting the
privilege.114

OK 707, ¶ 17, 249 P. 934, 937 (noting that a disclosure made in the presence of a third party
may still be privileged if it was “not openly made, but was in the nature of a confidential
communication”); Lively v. Wash. Co. Dist. Ct., 1987 OK CR 266, ¶¶ 2, 5, 747 P.2d 320, 321
(holding attorney-client privilege not waived when petitioner was surreptitiously filmed
conversing with his attorney over the telephone without having been Miranda-ized and in the
presence of two police officers).
110. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2511.
111. See 3 WHINERY, supra note 8, § 35.13.
112. Id.
113. See id. (citing 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIAL AT COMMON LAW § 2327,
at 636 (John T. McNaughten ed., 1961)).
114. See Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19, ¶¶ 35-36, 139 P.3d 907, 922 (adopting the
Whinery approach and holding that when the defendant and his spouse delivered his untrue alibi
to the police, the defendant waived spousal privilege by disclosing a significant part of the
conversation); Hooper v. State, 1997 OK CR 64, ¶¶ 46-50, 947 P.2d 1090, 1108-09 (holding
the defendant’s introduction of a medical report by a past doctor to support another doctor’s
testimony on defendant’s mental or psychological condition was a waiver of his privilege not
to have the past doctor testify because he voluntarily disclosed information that was based on
confidential communications). Despite the flexibility of the Whinery approach, these cases tend
to find subject matter waived.
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In summation, disclosure is voluntary in Oklahoma when it is made in a
situation manifesting no reasonable intention that the communication remain
confidential and under no compulsion to disclose. Such a disclosure requires
a disclosure of other related privileged information almost always, because the
disclosure was voluntary, and the intent to waive plays no part in the
protection of privilege.
3. Inadvertent Disclosure in Oklahoma
Prior to the passage of House Bill 1597, Oklahoma had no rule explicitly
governing inadvertent disclosure made during proceedings or to government
agencies. Absent such a provision, inadvertent disclosures were likely to have
been dealt with using the framework provided by Oklahoma’s distinction
between voluntary disclosures (which constitute waiver) and involuntary
disclosures (which do not constitute waiver).
Involuntary disclosures do not constitute a waiver of privilege.115
Involuntary disclosures are those erroneously compelled or made without an
opportunity to claim the privilege.116 Erroneously compelled disclosures “may
occur when the holder claims the privilege at trial and objects to questions
calling for a disclosure of the communication, but nevertheless complies with
an adverse ruling by the judge compelling the disclosure.”117 Disclosures
made without an opportunity to claim the privilege most often tend to be those
that are made by third parties:
This includes disclosure by eavesdroppers, by persons used in the
transmission of privileged matter, by co-participants in joint
defense and pooled information situations, and in group therapy
settings, or by data improperly made available from a data bank.
It may also include situations where the client has no choice in
disclosing the communication to a third person due to ineffective
legal counsel.118
Oklahoma case law offers some support for this characterization: “The
waiver provided in [section] 2511 cannot be triggered by actions of third
persons without the consent of the privilege holder or his or her
predecessor.”119 That is, such disclosures are not voluntary disclosures that
would waive the attorney-client privilege. Therefore, they must be disclosures

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

12 OKLA. STAT. § 2512 (2001).
Id.
3 WHINERY, supra note 8, § 35.15.
Id. § 35.16 (footnotes omitted).
Frederick v. State, 2001 OK CR 34, ¶ 194, 37 P.3d 908, 956.
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made without an opportunity to claim the privilege, and so are protected by
section 2512.
Inadvertent can mean either “unintentional” or “inattentive.”120 In the
context of Federal Rule of Evidence 502, it is likely that inadvertent more
often means “inattentive” than “unintentional:”
Although the disclosure of . . . [an inadvertently disclosed]
document may be intentional in the sense that the lawyer intends to
hand over all documents in its group, it is unintentional in the sense
that, if the lawyer had considered the privileged or protected nature
of its contents, she would not have disclosed the document.121
Generally, the party making the inadvertent disclosure is voluntarily making
the disclosure, even if that party does not intend that the information contained
in the disclosure should be disclosed.122 This intent to keep the information
contained in the disclosure confidential makes its disclosure seem akin to
involuntary disclosure. Claims of inadvertent disclosure, then, reveal the
tension between the voluntary and the involuntary as governing principles of
waiver in Oklahoma law. The tension seems likely under prior Oklahoma law
to have resulted in one of two approaches, either of which the courts might still
take in cases that the attorney-client privilege amendments do not reach.
a) Approach A
The disclosure would not waive the privilege. This seems most likely to
have occurred in the above examples given by Whinery,123 provided those
disclosures were made under circumstances where the disclosure by a third
party cannot reasonably have been anticipated;124 and provided that these
examples could be likened to the paradigmatic inadvertent disclosure, which
is made pursuant to a discovery request from an adversary in litigation.
Additionally, a disclosure probably would not waive the privilege in some
situations where the party claiming privilege intentionally made the disclosure,
but intended that it remain confidential—like those in the cases of Jayne v.

120. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1140 (1976).
121. Broun & Capra, supra note 19, at 219-20.
122. See id.
123. See 3 WHINERY, supra note 8, § 35.16 (giving as examples eavesdroppers, persons who
relay privileged information, joint defendants, group therapy, data improperly made available
from a data bank, disclosures due to ineffective counsel).
124. See id. § 35.06.
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Bateman,125 Ratzlaff v. State,126 or Lively v. Wash. County Dist. Ct.127 In those
cases, the court treated the disclosure almost as if it had not been made.128 The
inquiry here was not necessarily limited to the reasonableness of steps taken
to prevent disclosure, as it is in Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b).129 Such steps
may have factored into the inquiry’s primary focus, however, as indicia of
whether the disclosing party intended that the communication remain
confidential, because a party that intends communications to remain
confidential may take steps to prevent the confidence from being broken.130
It must be noted that steps taken to prevent disclosure are not the only
means of determining intended confidentiality.131 Cases characterized by
intentional disclosures which are intended to be confidential are somewhat
similar to the paradigmatic inadvertent disclosure cases.
Erroneously compelled disclosures are not included in this possible
approach to inadvertent disclosures because erroneously compelled disclosures
are intentionally, if unwillingly, disclosed.132 While compulsion to disclose is
inherent in the discovery system which gives rise to inadvertent disclosures,
the analysis for erroneously compelled disclosures is not appropriate to
inadvertent disclosures. Because these disclosures tend to be compelled
specifically, as when a doctor is ordered to testify as to material that she
believes to be protected by the physician-patient privilege, it is likely that the
party claiming the privilege is very attentive (that is, very advertent) to the
disclosure of privileged information. This has the same functional result—and
possibly the same functional inquiry—as those situations in which the court
might treat the disclosure as not a disclosure at all.
b) Approach B
The inadvertent disclosure would waive the privilege. This seems most
likely to have occurred in situations where the party claiming the privilege
intentionally made the disclosure, and surrounding circumstances did not

125. 1942 OK 298, 129 P.2d 188.
126. 1926 OK 707, 249 P. 934.
127. 1987 OK CR 266, 747 P.2d 320.
128. See Jayne, ¶ 24, 129 P.2d at 191; Ratzlaff, ¶ 17, 249 P. at 937; Lively, ¶¶ 2-3, 747 P.2d
at 321.
129. See FED. R. EVID. 502(b).
130. See Chandler v. Denton, 1987 OK 38, ¶ 21, 741 P.2d 855, 865-66 (treating the
confidential nature of the communication as dependent upon whether the client chooses to
disclose information in the presence of unnecessary third parties).
131. See Lively, ¶ 3, 747 P.2d at 321 (“[P]etitioner was apparently trying to obtain the advice
of counsel, having no knowledge that his conversation was being taped.”).
132. See 3 WHINERY, supra note 8, § 35.15.
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support any claimed intent that the communication be confidential.133 For
example, if no privilege review was conducted prior to disclosure under a
discovery request, and the parties had not even attempted to effectuate some
form of quick peek or claw-back agreement, it is unlikely (then, as now) that
a claim of inadvertent disclosure would have protected the attorney-client
privilege in Oklahoma. In some (but not all) cases, this outcome may also
have resulted from a disclosure where there was no opportunity to claim the
privilege; for example because an eavesdropper overheard the communication
and related it to the adversarial party. Although privilege is not waived when
there is no opportunity to claim the privilege,134 Whinery notes that in the case
of an eavesdropper, Oklahoma is consistent with the view that “privilege will
not protect communications made under circumstances in which
eavesdropping can reasonably be anticipated.”135
A modern incarnation of Whinery’s eavesdropper might be the metadata in
an electronic document. If a party responds to a discovery request by sending
a hastily-reviewed and redacted version of an original electronic document
containing confidential communication between the attorney and client, it must
reasonably be anticipated that the adversarial party will at the very least use the
“track changes” function of modern word processing software to search any
deletions that might have occurred, and may resort to outside software to mine
for other metadata. Following the eavesdropper example, a court might find
that the privilege would not protect such a disclosure. This outcome would be
particularly dangerous to a party claiming attorney-client privilege, as an
intentional disclosure that waives privilege as to the information
communicated may constitute a “significant part of the privileged matter,”
resulting in a finding that it is fair to demand subject matter waiver.136
c) Probable Outcome
The examples in Approach A are similar to typical inadvertent disclosure
cases, in that the client intends communications with an attorney to be
confidential and would not reasonably anticipate that the attorney would
disclose the privileged communication. On the other hand, similar to the
examples in Approach B, the attorney who discloses information in discovery
must reasonably anticipate the disclosure of privileged material—hence, the
need for privilege review. In the context of discovery, where parties are aware
that voluntary disclosure of privileged material constitutes waiver, and have
133. See Chandler, ¶ 21, 741 P.2d at 865-66.
134. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2512 (2001).
135. 3 WHINERY, supra note 8, § 35.06 (citing Lively, 1987 OK CR 266, 747 P.2d 320, and
noting that the conversation in that case was taped without the accused’s knowledge).
136. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2511 (Supp. 2002).
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the statutorily recognized tool of privilege logs at their disposal,137 a
responsible party prior to the November 2009 amendments must have expected
that a court would find waiver if the party attempted to argue for inadvertent
disclosure.
4. Court Orders and Party Agreements in Oklahoma
Claw-backs and quick peeks may be used in the Oklahoma court system to
mitigate discovery costs thanks to amendments to the discovery code that were
proposed and adopted after the amendments to attorney-client privilege.138
While not specifically mentioned in the amended Oklahoma statutes, and
despite the absence of comments similar to those that accompany the Federal
Rules, the broad authority to memorialize party discovery agreements granted
to courts almost certainly is intended to permit privilege review agreements.139
Also pursuant to statutory authority conferred by the Oklahoma Discovery
Code, courts can order the parties involved to refrain from using disclosed
information that should remain privileged and can memorialize party
agreements as binding on those parties.140
This authority to issue such court orders at the trial court level probably is
not binding on litigants who are not parties to the dispute in which an order
protecting privilege over disclosed information is ordered, however. On the
one hand, the general applicability of these “non-waiver” orders against nonparties to a dispute in the absence of something like Federal Rule of Evidence
502(d) is questionable, at best.141 Relevant legal doctrines further indicate that
absent express authority, a non-waiver order would only bind parties to the
137. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3226(B)(6) (Supp. 2009), amended by Act of Apr. 2, 2010, ch. 50,
§ 4, 2010 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 229 (West); Scott v. Peterson, 2005 OK 84, ¶ 24, 126 P.3d
1232, 1238-39 (holding that while 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3226 (Supp. 2004), does not require the
filing of a privilege log, under 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3237 (Supp. 2002), amended by Act of Apr.
2, 2010, ch. 50, § 8, 2010 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 243 (West) the court may order that a party file
a privilege log).
138. See S.B. 2039, ch. 50, §§ 4-8, 2010 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 229-46 (West) (codified at
12 OKLA. STAT. §§ 3226-3237 (Supp. 2010)) (bringing Oklahoma Discovery Code into greater
uniformity with the Federal Rules).
139. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3226(F) (“the court shall enter an order . . . establishing a plan
and schedule for discovery, setting limitations on discovery, if any; and determining such other
matters . . . as are necessary for the proper management of discovery in the action.”). Compare
id., with FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b), (c)(2), 26(f), and FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b) advisory committee’s
note (discussing the 2006 amendment).
140. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3226(C) (allowing courts to “enter any order which justice
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, harassment, embarrassment, oppression
or undue delay, burden or expense” (emphasis added) and including, but not explicitly or
implicitly limiting the court to, several example orders).
141. See Hopson v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 235 (D. Md. 2005).
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dispute. For example, the doctrine of issue preclusion applies only to parties
and their privies.142 Voluntary disclosure under a party agreement therefore
seems to result in waiver of privilege, at the very least with respect to
nonparties to the agreement.143
B. The Perceived Need For Waiver Protection in Oklahoma
The same ballooning costs that result from federal discovery
provisions—especially electronic discovery—are present in Oklahoma courts;
and Oklahoma courts will likely deal with those costs and attempts to mitigate
them in a similar fashion to federal courts to the extent our rules permit.144
Although Oklahoma has recently amended its discovery rules to bring them
nearer to uniformity with the 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,145 at least one significant difference remains. The pretrial
conference required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) is mandatory,
whereas the pretrial conference allowed by the Oklahoma Discovery Code is
optional.146 As a result, many state court litigators are likely to skip this
conference (which is an ideal place to limit the scope of discovery or hammer
out claw-back or quick peek agreements). Not only would an otherwise costsaving claw-back or quick peek agreement in state court expose a party to
waiver of attorney-client privilege, but now such an agreement is unlikely to
arise in the first place.
Compounding the statutory apathy toward effective cost-suppressing
discovery tools and the absence of statutory encouragement (in the form of
privilege protection) for using those tools is the dearth of Oklahoma case law
in this area. There are relatively few published opinions providing authority
for when disclosure constitutes waiver of attorney-client privilege.147 There
142. See Salazar v. City of Okla. City, 1999 OK 20, ¶ 10, 976 P.2d 1056, 1060-61
(explaining that the defense of issue preclusion only applies if the issue previously was litigated
between the parties currently litigating the issue when the defense is raised); see also, e.g., 47
AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 464 (2004) (introducing and explaining the doctrine of issue
preclusion).
143. It is conceivable that a protective order removing material from the public record
pursuant to 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3226(C)(2) could protect the privilege of disclosed material,
likely by considering it not to have been a disclosure at all, because it is intended to be
confidential, and must be so marked. Such a construction of the statute, however, strains it
beyond the likely legislative intent.
144. See Friot, supra note 99, at 1470-71.
145. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3226.
146. Compare 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3226(F) with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).
147. See Chandler v. Denton, 1987 OK 38, ¶ 20, 741 P.2d 855, 865 (holding that whether
communication overheard by third party was intended to be confidential controls whether
attorney-client privilege exists); Jayne v. Bateman, 1942 OK 298, ¶¶ 21, 24, 129 P.2d 188, 191
(same); Ratzlaff v. State, 1926 OK 707, ¶ 17, 249 P. 934, 937 (same); Hogan v. State, 2006 OK
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are even fewer cases on the interplay between privileged material and
discovery requests.148 The lack of cases does not, however, indicate the lack
of a growing problem, especially in the specific context of electronic
discovery.149
The same tension faced at the federal level between liberal discovery
requirements and a relatively narrow extension of attorney-client privilege
exists in Oklahoma. This tension led to the drafting of Federal Rule of
Evidence 502, but finds no release in Oklahoma. The current lack of statutory
authority and cases specific to this issue works against Oklahoma’s aim to
keep its evidence law similar to the Federal Rules because specific Federal
Rules have been adopted to deal with this issue.150 Furthermore, the lack of
Oklahoma authority on point allows the problems experienced at the federal
level prior to the enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 502 to fester in
Oklahoma’s state courts. It is possible that the recent amendments to attorneyclient privilege in Oklahoma were an attempt to alleviate this tension. In light
of this possibility, and in the hopes of predicting the success of the
amendments, an examination of those amendments is in order.

CR 19, ¶ 35, 139 P.3d 907, 922 (applying fairness test guided by policy underlying the privilege
to determine whether and when it is appropriate to find subject matter waiver of spousal
privilege); Gilson v. State, 2000 OK CR 14, ¶ 73, 8 P.3d 883, 909 (holding that attorney-client
privilege exists over subject matter disclosed to an attorney in the presence of a third party when
that third party was at the time, but no longer is, a codefendant); Hooper v. State, 1997 OK CR
64, ¶ 48, 947 P.2d 1090, 1108-09 (finding subject matter waiver of physician-patient privilege
was supported by defendant’s disclosure); Lively v. Wash. Cnty. Dist. Ct., 1987 OK CR 266,
¶ 3, 747 P.2d 320, 321 (holding that whether communication overheard by third party was
intended to be confidential controls whether attorney-client privilege exists); Naum v. State,
1981 OK CR 76, ¶¶ 9-10, 630 P.2d 785, 787-88 (holding that a conversation with a minister
about securing a lawyer was not protected under attorney-client privilege); Thompson v. Box,
1994 OK CIV APP 183, ¶¶ 11-12, 889 P.2d 1282, 1284-85 (holding that an attorney cannot
disclose a previous client’s privileged communication in order to support the attorney’s tort
claim against the client, absent one of the factors listed in 12 O KLA. STAT. § 2502(D) (1991)).
148. See Crest Infiniti II, LP v. Swinton, 2007 OK 77, ¶ 16, 174 P.3d 996, 1004 (holding that
party objecting to discovery on grounds provided in 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3226(C)(1) (Supp. 2004)
has burden of proof to show good cause why material should not be discoverable); Scott v.
Peterson, 2005 OK 84, ¶ 24, 126 P.3d 1232, 1238-39 (holding court may require party claiming
attorney-client privilege or work product protection to file a privilege log to provide evidentiary
support for its claim).
149. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 60; Jim Calloway, Tools for Electronic Discovery, 74
OKLA. B.J. 1529 (2003); Friot, supra note 99.
150. See FED. R. EVID. 502; FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B),(C).
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IV. A Textual Comparison of the Oklahoma Amendments and the Relevant
Provisions of Federal Rule of Evidence 502
The purpose of the attorney-client privilege amendments to the Oklahoma
Evidence Code apparently is to mitigate the costs of disclosure of privileged
material. Presumably, the Federal Rules of Evidence succeed (or will succeed)
at this task because they were drafted with the problems of increased requests
for disclosure and costly privilege review in mind.151 A comparison of the new
law to the pertinent sections of Federal Rule 502 should reveal whether
Oklahoma’s version is also likely to succeed. For the sake of ease, the text of
the rules of evidence pertinent to this argument is gathered in this section.
A. Federal Rule of Evidence 502
The pertinent text of Federal Rule of Evidence 502 follows, and governs
subject matter waiver, inadvertent disclosure, and controlling court orders:
Disclosure made in a federal proceeding or to a federal office or
agency; scope of a waiver. When the disclosure is made in a federal
proceeding or to a federal office or agency and waives the attorneyclient privilege or work-product protection, the waiver extends to
an undisclosed communication or information in a federal or state
proceeding only if:
(1) the waiver is intentional;
(2) the disclosed and undisclosed communications or
information concern the same subject matter; and
(3) they ought in fairness to be considered together.152
Inadvertent disclosure. When made in a federal proceeding or to
a federal office or agency, the disclosure does not operate as a
waiver in a federal or state proceeding if:
(1) the disclosure is inadvertent;
(2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps
to prevent the disclosure; and
(3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error,
including (if applicable) following Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B).153

151. See FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note.
152. Id. 502(a).
153. Id. 502(b).
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Controlling effect of a court order. A federal court may order that
the privilege or protection is not waived by disclosure connected
with the litigation pending before the court—in which event the
disclosure is also not a waiver in any other federal or state
proceeding.154
B. Amendments to 12 Okla. Stat. § 2502
The new sections of the amended Oklahoma law on attorney-client privilege
relate to subject matter waiver and inadvertent disclosure. They read:
Disclosure of a communication or information meeting the
requirements of an attorney-client privilege as set forth in this
section or the work-product doctrine to a governmental office,
agency or political subdivision in the exercise of its regulatory,
investigative, or enforcement authority does not operate as a waiver
of the privilege or protection in favor of nongovernmental persons
or entities. Disclosure of such information does not waive the
privilege or protection of undisclosed communications on the same
subject unless:
1. The waiver is intentional;
2. The disclosed and undisclosed communications or
information concern the same subject matter; and
3. Due to principles of fairness, the disclosed and undisclosed
communications or information should be considered together.155
A disclosure of a communication or information covered by the
attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine does not
operate as a waiver if:
1. The disclosure was inadvertent;
2. The holder of the privilege took reasonable steps to prevent
disclosure; and
3. The holder of the privilege took reasonable steps to rectify the
error including, but not limited to, information falling within the
scope of paragraph 4 of subsection B of Section 3226 of this title,
if applicable.156

154. Id. 502(d).
155. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2502(F) (Supp. 2009).
156. Id. § 2502(E).
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The notable absence in the Oklahoma amendments of a provision giving
greater effect to court orders, and allowing a court to protect the privileged
nature of disclosures made in proceedings before it, will be considered below
as a recommendation for improving on the new law.
V. Analysis of The Amendment Reveals An Intent to Mitigate Discovery
Costs and Provides a Foundation For Corrective Legislation to Actually
Effectuate Such a Mitigation in Oklahoma
Federal Rule of Evidence 502 was enacted to mitigate discovery costs
related to disclosure of privileged material.157 It is reasonable to conclude that
the amendments to Oklahoma’s attorney-client privilege statute, tracking the
Federal Rule as they do, share this same intent. Limiting subject matter waiver
and protecting inadvertent disclosures are a good start toward mitigating state
court costs associated with modern discovery.
It is notable, however, that the Oklahoma protection limiting subject matter
waiver is tied to the section permitting selective waiver, and does not extend
beyond that subsection.158 Additionally, the Oklahoma section on inadvertent
disclosure appears to govern all such disclosures, rather than just those made
in proceedings or to government parties.159 Furthermore, the amended statute
contains no provision on the authority of court orders protecting privilege.160
Whether the amended statute will succeed at its purpose remains to be seen,
but closer examination of the differences below may shed some light on this
possibility.
A. Analysis of the Amendments
1. Subject Matter Waiver
The statutory limitation on subject matter waiver is a good addition to
Oklahoma law because it brings predictability and uniformity with the Federal
Rules, and because it should lower discovery costs associated with privilege
review. The limitation is quite problematic, however, in that it is part of a
provision that also establishes selective waiver in Oklahoma.161 Any reading
of the statute consistent with commonly accepted principles of statutory
construction will find that the limitation on subject matter waiver is only

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note.
See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2502(F).
See id. § 2502(E).
See id. § 2502.
See id. § 2502(F).
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applicable in cases of selective waiver; and courts will probably decline to
extend the limitation beyond this relatively small subset of cases.
The amendment’s language on subject matter waiver is very similar to the
language in Federal Rule of Evidence 502,162 and should result in application
of the same test. The Oklahoma test for determining whether subject matter
has been waived remains a test of fairness under the new statute. Now,
however, the test favors the opposite result. To appreciate this, the old
Oklahoma fairness test must be contrasted to the Federal Rule, under which
limited subject matter waiver is the default result.163 The Federal Rule also
utilizes a fairness test; but unlike the fairness test from Oklahoma case law,
and like Federal Rule of Evidence 106, the fairness test of Federal Rule of
Evidence 502 seems to be focused on whether the disclosure is strategic; that
is, whether the disclosure is using the rule to gain unfair advantage.164
Under the old Oklahoma test (the flexibility of which was noteworthy when
contrasted to subject matter waiver under traditional waiver doctrine165) the
fairness test focused on whether waiver of subject matter was fair in light of
the facts of the case and the policy behind the privilege.166 However flexible
this test might have been, the cases examining whether it was fair to find
subject matter waiver tended to hold that it was.167 That is, the old test (still
applicable in all but selective waiver cases) appears to favor a finding of
subject matter waiver.
This is not to say that the results in the cases considering subject matter
waiver would have been decided differently had the fairness test from the
Federal Rules been in play. In Hogan v. State, the court held that it would
have been unfair to allow disclosure by parties of an alibi and protect as
privileged the duplicitous concoction of the alibi.168 In Hooper v. State, the
court held that it would have been unfair to allow disclosure of a written
medical report finding mental incompetence and protect as privileged the
reporting doctor’s rationale for making that diagnosis.169
However,
considering the policy behind most of the privileges is to protect

162. Compare id. § 2502(F), with FED. R. EVID. 502(a).
163. See FED. R. EVID. 502(a).
164. See id. 502(a) advisory committee’s note.
165. See Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19, ¶ 35, 139 P.3d 907, 922.
166. See id.
167. See id. at ¶ 36, 139 P.3d at 922; Hooper v. State, 1997 OK CR 64, ¶ 50, 947 P.2d 1090,
1109.
168. See ¶¶ 34, 36, 139 P.3d at 922. This seems to be a contrary result, however, to one that
supports a policy protecting the marital relationship and encouraging the open and free flow of
communication between spouses.
169. See ¶ 48, 947 P.2d at 1108-09.
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confidentiality,170 it seems that the default result under the old Oklahoma
fairness test for any disclosure was subject matter waiver. The new default,
at least in selective waiver cases, is that privilege is not waived as to the
subject matter of disclosures, and it is this default that should result in
discovery cost savings.
2. Subject Matter Waiver Tied to Selective Waiver
The first half of the new provision limiting subject matter waiver
undermines any potential mitigation of discovery costs on a generally
appreciable level, however.171 This provision very clearly ties the limitation
on subject matter waiver to selective waiver by first introducing selective
waiver, and then applying the subject matter waiver limitation only to the
“[d]isclosure of such information.”172
With the exception of the Eighth Circuit and some district courts, most
federal courts do not allow selective waiver.173 Selective waiver was initially
proposed as Federal Rule of Evidence 502(c), but was not adopted by
Congress.174 The provision on selective waiver read:
Selective Waiver.-In a federal or state proceeding, a disclosure of
a communication or information covered by the attorney-client
privilege or work product protection—when made to a federal
public office or agency in the exercise of its regulatory,
investigative, or enforcement authority—does not operate as a
waiver of the privilege or protection in favor of non-governmental
persons or entities. The effect of disclosure to a state or local
government agency, with respect to non-governmental persons or
entities, is governed by applicable state law. Nothing in this rule
limits or expands the authority of a government agency to disclose
communications or information to other government agencies or as
otherwise authorized or required by law.175
Selective waiver essentially encourages a party to cooperate with a federal
agency or a federal investigation by disclosing otherwise privileged
170. See 3 WHINERY, supra note 8, § 35.02.
171. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2502(F) (Supp. 2009).
172. Id.
173. See Broun & Capra, supra note 19, at 229.
174. See Richter, supra note 14, at 158. Note also that court orders issued pursuant to FED.
R. EVID. 502(d) and party agreements pursuant to 502(e) cannot be construed to allow selective
waiver. See 154 C ONG . REC. H7818 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2008) (Statement of Congressional
Intent Regarding Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
175. Proposed FED. R. EVID. 502, supra note 14.
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information for the use of the federal agency or investigation without thereby
waiving that privilege in respect to nongovernment parties.176
The selective waiver provision in the Oklahoma law is broader in scope
than the selective waiver initially proposed for Federal Rule of Evidence 502.
The Oklahoma language indicates that selective waiver applies to all
disclosures made to “a governmental office, agency, or political
subdivision.”177 The proposed Federal Rule, in contrast, would have applied
selective waiver only to disclosures made to the federal government, leaving
disclosures made to state governments to be governed by the substantive law
of those states.178
The benefits of selective waiver are better relayed elsewhere,179 but selective
waiver is a welcome addition to Oklahoma privilege law, even if it will not do
much to combat overall discovery costs at the Oklahoma state court level.
Selective waiver will particularly benefit Oklahoma corporations involved in
federal litigation. Because Oklahoma allows selective waiver, Oklahoma law
grants a more expansive protection of privilege than the Federal Rule. Federal
courts should apply Oklahoma’s selective waiver laws to Oklahoma
corporations who cooperate in federal investigations.180
Selective waiver fails to provide widespread mitigation of discovery costs,
however, because of its limited application only to disclosures made to the
government. While there are strategic benefits to maintaining privilege with
respect to nongovernment parties (litigation is likely to be more successful if
a party has not waived the privilege to keep confidential all of his or her
damning secrets), selective waiver probably won’t have much impact on
discovery costs at the state level because most litigation is civil litigation
between private parties. Voluntary disclosure to nongovernment parties still
results in waiver of privilege and of subject matter under Oklahoma law.181
Despite its limited application, selective waiver is a good addition to
Oklahoma law. It will benefit Oklahoma by providing prosecutors with a
legitimate investigative tool without undermining the attorney-client privilege
and damning good corporate citizens in civil suits.182

176. See Richter, supra note 14, at 132.
177. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2502(F) (Supp. 2009). A reading of the plain language
presumably includes not only the federal and Oklahoma governments, but any other state, local,
or foreign government, as well.
178. Proposed FED. R. EVID. 502, supra note 14.
179. See, e.g., Richter, supra note 14.
180. FED. R. EVID. 502(c).
181. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2502(F); 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2511 (Supp. 2002).
182. See Richter, supra note 14, at 134.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011

306

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:279

This same limited application applies to the limitation on subject matter
waiver. The old approach to subject matter waiver is still applicable in the
majority of cases because limited subject matter waiver is tied to selective
waiver, and because title 12, section 2511 remains undisturbed.183 Because the
rule in Oklahoma remains unchanged for the most part, any intended savings
on the cost of discovery from limiting subject matter waiver are likely to be
negligible. Furthermore, rather than creating a uniform rule, this tepid attempt
at limiting subject matter waiver in Oklahoma results in even less uniformity
with the Federal Rules. Now there is more complexity and inconsistency due
to the fact that two approaches to subject matter waiver exist in Oklahoma law.
Despite the benefits of selective waiver, because of its inapplicability to most
litigation, the discovery cost savings that will come to Oklahoma will probably
amount to no more than a drop in the bucket. The savings from the new
limitation on subject matter waiver, tied as it is to selective waiver, are a
molecule of that drop.
3. Inadvertent Disclosure
The passage of an amendment specifically clarifying the privileged status
of inadvertently disclosed information is a good thing, because it provides
predictability and uniformity, and because it mitigates the fallout from such
inadvertent disclosures. Unfortunately, the amendment as passed raises some
issues of clarity and statutory construction. Relatively minor changes to the
provision would allow the attorney-client privilege statute to truly be effective
in mitigating discovery costs.
Courts will now judge all inadvertent disclosures by a uniform standard.184
Because of the similarity of the Oklahoma rule to the Federal Rule, that
treatment should mimic the Federal Rule of Evidence 502 approach and take
the middle ground between never treating inadvertent disclosure as a waiver
and always treating inadvertent disclosure as a waiver. A uniform analysis that
courts can apply to claims of inadvertent disclosure will remove some of the
uncertainty of litigation; and the closer the new rule is to the Federal Rule, the
more case law for persuasive precedent will be at the Oklahoma court’s
disposal.185
183. “A person upon whom this Code confers a privilege against disclosure waives the
privilege if the person or the person’s predecessor voluntarily discloses or consents to disclose
any significant part of the privileged matter. This section does not apply if the disclosure itself
is privileged.” 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2511 (2010).
184. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2502(E).
185. See e.g., Amobi v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., No. 08-1501, 2009 WL 4609593, at *1 (D.
D.C., Dec. 8, 2009). Currently, there are a limited number of federal court orders and decisions,
published and unpublished, that utilize Federal Rule of Evidence 502, and this number will no

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss2/2

2011]

COMMENTS

307

Because inadvertent disclosure will not always result in waiver of privilege,
costs of discovery should be mitigated by protection for inadvertent
disclosures. In proceedings, mandatory discovery encourages disclosure and
discourages—through sanctions—withholding information.186
With the
increase in electronic storage and electronic discovery requests, it is likely that
material intended to be kept confidential will increasingly be disclosed, even
after costly pre-discovery privilege review.
Prior to House Bill 1597, if a party inadvertently disclosed information,
there was little certainty that a court would accept the argument that there was
intent to keep the information confidential. Inadvertent disclosures in
discovery are voluntary disclosures (albeit of information that was not
intended to be disclosed), and voluntary disclosure to a non-privileged party
is an indicator that there is no intent to keep information confidential.187 It
does not seem likely that a court would have accepted the argument that there
was a de facto compulsion to disclose (stemming from the ungodly cost of
review and probability of sanctions if discovery requests are refused). While
such results were indeed possible, the only rational choice a party could make
with respect to production during discovery was to be as wary as possible of
the court ruling against it and to conduct exhaustive privilege review. By
taking the middle path between the “always” and “never” approaches to
waiver, the Oklahoma rule will provide a firmer ground for declining to find
waiver than treating inadvertent disclosure as not really a disclosure at all.
After the passage of House Bill 1597, however, the court will face a number
of problems in cases of inadvertent disclosure. Whereas the Federal Rule
applies only to disclosures “made in a Federal proceeding or to a Federal
office or agency,”188 the Oklahoma rule applies to any disclosure.189 One could
argue that the rule artificially binds Oklahoma’s treatment of inadvertent
disclosure. By creating a conjunctive test that requires reasonable steps taken
to prevent and rectify every inadvertent disclosure, the new rule may remove
from the Oklahoma Evidence Code some of the flexibility that is its
hallmark.190 In situations where Oklahoma’s law does not track the application
of the Federal Rules quite so closely as it does in the discovery context (such
as inadvertent disclosures made outside of any government proceeding, as
doubt increase over time.
186. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3226(B)(1) (Supp. 2009), amended by Act of Apr. 2, 2010, ch. 50,
§ 4, 2010 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 229 (West); 12 OKLA. STAT . § 3237 (Supp. 2002), amended
by Act of Apr. 2, 2010, ch. 50, § 8, 2010 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 243 (West).
187. Chandler v. Denton, 1987 OK 38, ¶ 21, 741 P.2d 855, 865-66.
188. FED. R. EVID. 502(b).
189. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2502(E).
190. See Whinery, supra note 91, at 263-64.
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between individuals, or in the case of an eavesdropper), a party may have
acted reasonably, even if the party took no steps to prevent an inadvertent
disclosure, and the only step taken to rectify the error was filing a motion to
exclude the disclosure as privileged.
Under the new law, however, claims of inadvertent disclosure—even those
made outside of discovery—require the party to have taken reasonable steps
to prevent and rectify the disclosure.191 This will possibly result in a different
disposition of some disclosures than would have resulted under the old
“voluntary/involuntary” test. Perhaps this issue could have been avoided if the
Oklahoma rule had been limited, similarly to the Federal Rule, to disclosures
made in government proceedings and to government agencies. This would
have allowed a court to limit its examination to whether the disclosure was
intended to be confidential. Having identified this as a problem, however, it
should be noted that the concept of inadvertent disclosure was born in
discovery,192 so hopefully there will not be many assertions of inadvertent
disclosure outside of that context.
A more pressing issue than the scope of the provision arises from its
construction. The Oklahoma rule on inadvertent disclosure, in listing the steps
taken to “rectify the error,” includes “information falling within the scope of
paragraph 4 of subsection B of Section 3226 of [title 12] . . . .”193 Two
problems (the first of which is really little more than a minor quibble) are
immediately apparent in this clause. The first is that the English language does
not include among its verbs “information.” It is hard, then, to understand how
“information” is something one can do to rectify an error. Compare this with
the Federal Rule, which recommends “following” the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure to which it points.194
The second quibble concerns statutory organization. The paragraph to
which the new rule points likely is the paragraph in the superseded version of
title 12, section 3226 of the Oklahoma Statutes.195 On the same day that the
new section 2502 went into effect, an amended version of section 3226 also
went into effect, pursuant to House Bill 1603.196 This amended section 3226
added some “tort reform” provisions to the Oklahoma Discovery Code and,
relevant to this argument, renumbered other provisions. What was once
191. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2502(E).
192. See Broun & Capra, supra note 19, at 219-20.
193. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2502(E)(3).
194. FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(3).
195. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3226 (Supp. 2004), amended by 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3226 (Supp.
2009), amended by 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3226 (2010).
196. See Act of May 21, 2009, ch. 228, § 20, 2009 Okla. Sess. Laws 968-72 (codified at 12
OKLA. STAT. § 3226 (Supp. 2009), amended by 12 OKLA. STAT. 3226 (2010)).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss2/2

2011]

COMMENTS

309

section 3226, subsection B, paragraph 4, became section 3226, subsection B,
paragraph 6.197 The new “paragraph 4” governed the discovery of what has
been called “ordinary work product,”198 and was numbered as subsection B,
paragraph 2 in the old statute.199 While Oklahoma courts are likely to
understand that section 2502(E) is pointing to what became paragraph 6,
rather than what became paragraph 4, this renumbering created confusion that
is going to be present until there is either a corrective recodification of section
2502(E) or an authoritative ruling from the courts. Considering that the 2009
amendments to both section 2502 and section 3226 were offered by the same
author200 (Representative Dan Sullivan of the Oklahoma House of
Representatives, rather than the Oklahoma Bar Association subcommittees on
evidence and civil procedure) and that “work-product” is relevant to the
amended section 2502,201 this confusion has some basis. An argument that the
inadvertent disclosure provision does not point to what became paragraph 6
may, unfortunately, have more validity than it otherwise might.
Indeed, corrective recodification or a ruling from the courts is even more
necessary than it was after the 2009 amendments, because since those
amendments went into effect (and after this article was substantively
complete), the Oklahoma Bar Association proposed and the legislature adopted
newer amendments to section 3226 (and to most of the Discovery Code) to
bring it closer to uniformity with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
newest version of “paragraph 4 of subsection B of section 3226 of [title 12]”
concerns discovery and expert witnesses.202 The correct target of section 2502
is now title 12, section 3226, subsection B, paragraph 5, subparagraph b.203
197. Compare 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3226 (Supp. 2009), amended by 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3226
(2010), with 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3226 (Supp. 2004), amended by 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3226 (Supp.
2009).
198. Scott v. Peterson, 2005 OK 84 ¶ 8, 126 P.3d 1232, 1235.
199. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3226 (Supp. 2004), amended by 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3226 (Supp.
2009).
200. See Act of Nov. 1, 2009, ch. 251, § 2, 2009 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 1470, 1470-71
(West) (codified at 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2502 (Supp. 2009)); Act of May 21, 2009, ch. 228, § 20,
2009 Okla. Sess. Laws 968-74 (codified at 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3226 (Supp. 2009), amended by
12 OKLA. STAT. § 3226 (2010)).
201. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2502(F) (Supp. 2009).
202. See id. § 2502(E); see also 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3226(B)(4)(2010).
203. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3226(B)(5)(b) (2010).
If information produced in discovery is subject to a claim of privilege or of
protection as trial preparation material, the party making the claim may notify any
party that received the information of the claim and the basis for it. After being
notified, a party shall promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified
information and any copies the party has; shall not use or disclose the information
until the claim is resolved; shall take reasonable steps to retrieve the information
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4. Controlling Court Orders and Party Agreements
The amended statute does not contain any language that extends the
authority of a court to protect privilege through court orders, or of parties to
enter into agreements protecting privilege amongst themselves.204 One of the
primary tools of cost mitigation adopted by Federal Rule of Evidence 502 is
therefore not available to practitioners in Oklahoma state courts. This
omission subverts the presumed “cost saving” intent of the amendments to
attorney-client privilege.
B. Recommendations for Further Legislation
The amended statute has the apparent intent to mitigate the rising costs of
discovery. The attempt to keep discovery costs down may result in some relief
to Oklahoma litigants. Selective waiver seems to be a welcome addition to the
law on privilege, and limitations on subject matter waiver, chained though they
are to selective waiver, may keep some discovery costs down. A clear
intention to protect inadvertent disclosures from constituting waiver is
laudable. It appears that this statute is a good faith effort to bring Oklahoma
closer to uniformity with the Federal Rules. Because it falls short of this,
however, further legislation should be pursued.
1. Subject Matter Waiver
The limitation on subject matter waiver should be untied from selective
waiver, and the two provisions moved to separate subsections. Further
limiting subject matter waiver, so that the limitations apply not only to
selective waiver cases but also to disclosures made in government proceedings
or to government offices or agencies, similarly to the Federal Rule, would
better mitigate discovery costs. This is because there would be fewer
consequences for making a disclosure (unless the disclosure was made to gain
an unfair advantage). Privilege review, then, would not need to be as rigorous
and demanding as it currently is, and recognition software that has been used

if the party has disclosed it before being notified; and may promptly present the
information to the court under seal for a determination of the claim. The
producing party shall preserve the information until the claim is resolved. This
mechanism is procedural only and does not alter the standards governing whether
the information is privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation material
or whether such privilege or protection has been waived.
Id.
204. See id. § 2502.
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in federal courts205 could be safely used to screen electronic documents for
privileged information prior to disclosure in Oklahoma cases.
If it is untied from selective waiver, limited subject matter waiver is
consistent with the Oklahoma policy of considering fairness, because it still
allows for subject matter waiver in those cases where it would be unfair not to
find it.206 A universal limitation on subject matter waiver of information
protected by attorney-client privilege would bring clarity and simplicity to
Oklahoma’s law because it would apply to all cases of disclosure. A rule
based on the Federal Rules would also be able to draw on the interpretation of
federal courts, which not only have seen but likely will see many more cases
on this issue than will Oklahoma’s state courts. It would therefore give parties
arguing subject matter waiver in Oklahoma courts a test that provides greater
predictability than they currently have.
A broad limitation on subject matter waiver would also prevent
retrogression in the waiver doctrine that might be indicated by the current
Oklahoma cases.207 Although Oklahoma’s cases, too, seem to require a test of
fairness, so far the courts have more often than not found waiver. More
frequent waiver means that parties must jealously guard against disclosures of
even potentially privileged information, and at a much higher cost. Increasing
costs and decreasing efficiency work against any modernization of the
Oklahoma Discovery Code or the Oklahoma Evidence Code, as well as against
their stated purposes.208
2. Inadvertent Disclosure
The rule on inadvertent disclosure should be linguistically clarified and the
scope of the rule narrowed to disclosures made in proceedings.209 The
inadvertent disclosure provision in the Evidence Code should also be amended
to point to the correct subsection of the Discovery Code. This would provide
effective steps that could be taken to rectify inadvertent disclosures.
Oklahoma’s section 2502 might better be limited in scope only to
disclosures made in government proceedings and to government agencies.
This would probably control most disclosures and include all disclosures made
during discovery. This limitation would leave Oklahoma courts with the
previous rules in place to deal with situations that don’t quite fit under the
“reasonable steps” test, in which all the given steps are focused on disclosures
205. See FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note.
206. See Broun & Capra, supra note 19, at 229.
207. See, e.g., Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19, 139 P.3d 907; Hooper v. State, 1997 OK CR
64, 947 P.2d 1090.
208. See 12 OKLA. STAT. §§ 2102, 3225 (2001).
209. See id. § 2502(E).
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made during discovery. The courts should be able to apply the older case law
in cases that don’t apply to discovery—to look to whether there was intent to
disclose, or perhaps treat the disclosure as if it weren’t a disclosure at all. That
way, the new rule, which more clearly pertains to discovery, is less likely to
be encumbered with precedent that stretches it to baffling places in order to
reach a just result in cases pertaining to disclosures made outside of discovery.
A future amendment should redirect the pointer in the third prong of the
inadvertent disclosure test to the appropriate location in the Oklahoma
Discovery Code to avoid unnecessary confusion and extended billable hours
as research is conducted and legal arguments are crafted. The appropriate
location is not the provision on discovery and expert witnesses.
3. Controlling Court Orders
Further legislation tracking Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d) should add
controlling effect to court orders (to protect claw-backs and quick peeks) to the
Oklahoma Evidence Code. The lack of such an amendment is the most glaring
omission from and error in the new section 2502, and the most effective
provision that should be added to the Evidence Code to keep discovery costs
down. Claw-backs and quick peeks would act as a bigger money saver than
selective waiver because they are more generally applicable to litigation.
Furthermore, because the use of these tools is generally agreed to by parties
themselves, the parties might be less inclined to raise challenges.
If, at a later date, discovery conferences are made mandatory, rather than
optional, this would provide further benefit to parties and support the use of
claw-backs and quick peeks. Because the parties would of necessity be forced
to sit down and talk about the scope of discovery, they might be encouraged
to utilize these agreements. Any drafting burden on the courts might also be
eased, because the parties would hammer out the agreement, and the court
order could simply adopt it. Mandatory conferences would save litigants even
more discovery costs in many cases by narrowing the scope of discovery in
general, or at least by giving notice to all parties of the discovery conflicts
likely to arise.
The rules compel discovery of what can be quite copious amounts of
information, and an order protecting quick peeks would certainly reduce the
number of documents over which the parties would then be disputing. An
order protecting claw-backs might make this compulsory discovery more
palatable.
Expanding the authority of a court to issue orders binding other courts to
protect the privilege of disclosed information would be not only consistent
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with, but representative of, the flexibility of Oklahoma’s Evidence Code.210
Currently the courts’ hands are tied in this respect. This flexibility is
embodied by section 3226(C) of Title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes, under
which a court, in the interests of justice, could conceivably craft an order
protecting the privilege of disclosed information between parties.211 Without
the authority to bind nonparties or other proceedings on the issue of privilege,
discovery costs—specifically costs of privilege review—are not likely to be
reduced at all as a result of such an order. Any parties that disclose dependent
upon the protection of such a constrained order would win the battle at the
expense of the war. While they may be able to prevent their adversarial parties
from utilizing disclosed but protected information, it is likely that nonparties
will still have a valid claim that the privilege has been waived.212
Under a provision similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d), the court
would not be limited to memorializing party agreements, or the lack thereof,
in the order it crafted.213 Even if parties could not come to a consensus on the
scope of the agreement, or if they craft no agreement at all, a court could
unilaterally enter an order protecting privilege in case of the disclosure of
certain confidential information.
Note, however, that while the addition of controlling court orders would be
consistent with, and representative of, the policy behind the Oklahoma rules,
it would also change the current law of privilege by protecting privileges when
disclosures are voluntary (and, indeed, very deliberate). This would not
drastically depart from Oklahoma’s privilege law, however, because such
voluntary and deliberate disclosures would be made only when an order
protecting privilege existed, in the belief that the disclosure was therefore
privileged.214 The court orders would not of necessity extend privilege to
voluntary disclosures made without the protection of a party agreement or a

210. These privilege protection orders would not automatically protect privilege over
disclosed information if subsequent litigation were brought in another state, for obvious reasons.
This is not overly problematic, however, because the various approaches to conflicts of law in
the several states already must deal with cases where information is privileged under the laws
of one state and not under the laws of the other. Parties protected by these orders would only
be faced with problems in states that would not recognize any of their privileges under
Oklahoma law.
211. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3226(C) (2010).
212. See Marcus, supra note 51, at 1612.
213. See FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note.
214. See, e.g., Ratzlaff v. State, 1926 OK 707, ¶ 17, 249 P. 934, 937 (holding that
communications “not openly made but . . . in the nature of a confidential communication” are
privileged); see also 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2511 (2010) (protecting privilege over a voluntary
disclosure when that disclosure is also privileged).
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court order. Parties hoping to keep information confidential would still be
deterred from disclosing it.
VI. Conclusion
The recent changes to the Oklahoma Evidence Code are necessary to bring
the state closer to the degree of uniformity with the Federal Rules of Evidence
that the Code embraces.215 Oklahoma attorney-client privilege law currently
cannot achieve the same results as the Federal Rules without stretching past
the breaking point. The skyrocketing cost of discovery—especially of
electronically stored information—coupled with the threat of waiver of
privilege gave rise to Federal Rule of Evidence 502. These same threats exist
in Oklahoma at the state level and could not be adequately dealt with under
superseded Oklahoma law. Limiting subject matter waiver and offering some
protection for the privileged nature of inadvertently disclosed communications
should somewhat mitigate the shortcoming of the superseded law. In addition,
the addition of selective waiver to the law of privilege is beneficial, not only
for the general public in Oklahoma, but for Oklahoma corporations, or at least
for those Oklahoma corporations that respect the law enough to voluntarily
assist government entities in its enforcement.
The changes are somewhat problematic, however, because the general
limitation on subject matter waiver exists solely in selective waiver cases, and
because the provision on inadvertent disclosure is ungrammatical and
misdirecting. Further, the changes to title 12, section 2502 are not enough to
combat the rising costs of discovery. Without the ability to avoid costly
privilege review, especially of electronically stored information, litigating
parties in Oklahoma must expect that the costs of any given suit will far
exceed the merits of the case, a situation which is contrary to the purpose
behind the Evidence and Discovery Codes. Without the ability to issue orders
protective of privilege that are binding on nonparties and other courts,
Oklahoma courts are also left with the difficult choice between prohibiting
costly discovery that might yield important information and requiring costly
discovery in spite of the policy of economy and justice that drives the rules.
To fix the shortcomings of the amended law on attorney-client privilege,
further legislation should be passed as soon as is practicable. The best model
of uniformity for further legislation is Federal Rule of Evidence 502.
Limitations on subject matter waiver should be untied from selective waiver
and applied generally to all disclosures. The scope of the provision on
inadvertent disclosure should be narrowed to disclosures made in government
215. See SUBCOMM. ON EVID., supra note 92, at 2606 (Subcommittee Chairman Ed Abel’s
introduction to the proposed rules).
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proceedings or to government offices or agencies. The language should be
tweaked, and the statutory pointer the provision provides for rectifying
measures should be corrected.
To address the shortcomings in current Oklahoma attorney-client privilege
law and the mounting costs of discovery, further legislation should add a
provision tracking Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d), under which an
Oklahoma court could issue an order protecting the privilege of disclosed
information, and that order would bind other courts and non-parties to the
original dispute. Preproduction privilege review would then be easier and less
costly. Because of the likelihood that such a provision would be more
generally useful to the majority of parties litigating in Oklahoma, a provision
such as this would reduce the potential costs of discovery for most Oklahoma
litigants.
The new law is beneficial and indicates a good faith effort to modernize
Oklahoma’s Evidence Code to deal with the realities of litigation in this
century. Unfortunately, the 2009 amendments are not likely to have much
effect on the average litigant’s pocketbook. Fewer potential litigants will
benefit under the new law than otherwise might have, if the other provisions
of the Federal Rule had been incorporated. The new law highlights
Oklahoma’s opportunity and desire to once again “become a leader in the
reform of the rules of evidence in the state court systems.”216 Hopefully this
desire will carry us forward to further reform. If it does not, then the halfhearted amendments to the statute will become less a starting block and more
a stumbling block, and Oklahoma state court practitioners and their clients will
be left trying to catch up to the twenty-first century.
Robert A. Brown

216. See id. at 2607.
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